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I. THE ALl DRAFT RESTATEMENT
The American Law Institute's Draft Restatement on Corpo-
rate Governance' has received, at best, mixed reactions. Critics
contend that adoption of the Draft Restatement would substan-
tially change the methods by which corporations function2 by in-
terposing rigid rules antithetical to the composition and operation
of profit-maximizing boards.3 According to these views, adoption of
the Draft would cause a proliferation of shareholder derivative
suits, 4 thereby increasing directors' exposure to liability5 and de-
* Associate Professor, School of Law, University of Maryland; A.B., University of
Michigan; J.D., University of California, Los Angeles; LL.M., Yale University; Member, Cal-
ifornia and District of Columbia Bars.
1. PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
2. See, e.g., Andrews, Rigid Rules Will Not Make Good Boards, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.-
Dec. 1982, at 34; Block & Prussin, Updating Corporate Governance: Who Needs It & Why?,
DIRECTORSHIP, July-Aug. 1982, at 3; Lewin, The Corporate-Reform Furor, N.Y. Times, June
10, 1982, at D1, col. 3; American Law Institute Begins Debate on Corporate Governance
Project, 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 22, at 1025 (June 4, 1982) [hereinafter cited as
ALl Begins Debate].
3. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 2, at 38-39.
4. See, e.g., Block & Prussin, supra note 2, at 12; Lewin, supra note 2, at D6, cols. 5-6
(view of the Business Roundtable's Corporate Responsibility Task Force).
5. See authorities cited supra note 4.
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terring qualified candidates from serving on corporate boards.6 In-
deed, some critics characterize the Restatement effort as "pre-
sumptuous"7 and "appallingly arrogant."
In view of these harsh criticisms, it is surprising that the Re-
porters for the Draft Restatement believe that they have not pro-
posed any massive reforms.9 In a way they are correct. Under cur-
rent practice, a majority of large publicly held corporations may be
"monitored," rather than managed, by their boards of directors."0
These corporations may have boards composed of a majority of
"outside"" directors. 12 They may also have audit committees con-
6. See Lewin, supra note 2, at D6, col. 6 (view of John Stichnoth, General Counsel,
Union Carbide Corporation).
7. Id. at D6, col. 5 (view of Roderick M. Hills, former chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission).
8. Id. at D6, col. 4 (view of Andrew Sigler, President and Chairman of Champion Inter-
national Corporation and Chairman of the Business Roundtable's Corporate Responsibility
Task Force).
9. Id. (views of Stanley A. Kaplan and Harvey J. Goldschmid, Chief and Deputy Chief
Reporter, respectively, of the ALI Draft Restatement).
10. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, §§ 3.01-.02; Committee on Corporate Laws, ABA
Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33
Bus. LAW. 1591, 1603 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Corporate Director's Guidebook] (respon-
sibility of board of directors is limited to "overseeing" the operation of the business). As
disclosed by the President of the ALI, the ALI Council replaced the term "monitor" with
the term "oversee" in order "to meet the concern expressed by some that an obligation to
'monitor' involved a more active and wide-ranging obligation than was contemplated." R.
Perkins, Background and Status of ALI Corporate Governance Project and Commentary on
Papers of Professors Andrews, Demsetz, and MacAvoy (Exhibits A, B and C to Feb. 1983
Statement of the Business Roundtable) app. at 1 (remarks at forum at the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, Mar. 14, 1983).
11. The term "outside" in this context refers to directors who are not affiliated with the
corporation, its senior executives, or its controlling shareholders. Looking at directors who
have relationships with the corporation that require disclosure under Item 6(b) of Schedule
14A of the SEC's proxy rules, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1983), however, there is a question
whether most publicly held corporations have boards composed of a majority of "disinter-
ested" directors. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 3.03 comment a, at 72-73 (studies cited
therein). If this is indeed the case, then section 3.03(a) may effect a change in current prac-
tice by requiring that a majority of directors "shall be free of any significant relationships
[as defined in section 1.24] with the corporation's senior executives." Id. § 3.03(a).
12. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 3.03 comment a, at 72-73 (studies cited therein).
For example, in 1978 the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") conducted a corporate gov-
ernance survey. The American Association of Corporate Secretaries mailed questionnaires to
their 1700 members, of which 993 responded (58% of the membership). Six hundred fifty-
five of these respondents were NYSE companies. The survey indicated that approximately
80% of the companies responding had a board of directors composed of a majority of
nonmanagerial directors. It also indicated a marked increase, as compared to 1975, in the
number of companies that had established audit, compensation, and nominating commit-
tees, as well as a marked increase in the number of such committees composed of
nonmanagerial directors. Of the companies responding (both NYSE and non-NYSE compa-
nies), 92% maintained an audit committee composed of nonmanagerial directors. Subse-
[Vol. 37:295
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sisting solely of outside directors."3 By setting forth these stan-
dards and monitoring mechanisms,' 4 the Draft Restatement is sim-
ply a reflection of current practice.'5 Moreover, in view of the
Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Zapata Corp. v. Maldo-
nado," the Draft Restatement's treatment of the business judg-
ment rule in the context of the special litigation committee is not a
radical departure from present law.
Unlike current practice, however, under which corporations
have voluntarily established "independent" boards and audit com-
mittees, the Draft Restatement takes the step of requiring such
measures. 17 In the implicit view of its critics, such mandatory prac-
tices are perhaps the Restatement's greatest deficiency. They re-
present a departure from the established norm that the internal
affairs of corporate life are generally best left to private regulation.
Governmental intervention in corporate governance is warranted
only when required by meritorious countervailing interests, such as
those of the shareholders or the state.'8 Even the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"), during the chairmanship of Har-
old M. Williams, 9 generally called for voluntary action. Although
Chairman Williams proposed that the ideal board of directors
should consist of independent directors (except for the chief execu-
quent studies conducted in 1980 and 1981 indicate that, from a corporate accountability
perspective, these figures have improved. See Steinberg, The Securities and Exchange
Commission's Administrative, Enforcement, and Legislative Programs and Policies-Their
Influence on Corporate Internal Affairs, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 173, 181 n.31 (1982).
13. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 3.05 comment a, at 85-86 (studies cited therein).
An SEC staff survey of 1200 corporations revealed that 85% had audit committees and that
a majority of these committees were made up solely of independent directors. SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTA-
BILITY 488 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as SEC STAFF CORPORATE AcCoUNTABILITY
REPORT].
14. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, §§ 3.01-.03, .05.
15. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
16. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); see also Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983); Miller v. Register and Tribune Syndicate, 336 N.W.2d 709
(Iowa 1983).
17. It appears that the ALI Council, although retaining the requirement of "indepen-
dent" audit committees for large publicly held corporations, has changed the Draft Restate-
ment's mandate that there be a majority of outside directors of such corporations to that of
"'good corporate practice.'" R. Perkins, supra note 10, at 11.
18. See Andrews, supra note 2. See generally Kripke, The SEC, Corporate Govern-
ance, and the Real Issues, 36 Bus. LAW. 173 (1981) (expressing concern whether putting
"public interest" concerns ahead of profit maximization would ultimately be beneficial to
society); Wolfson, A Criticism of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 30 EMORY L.J.
119 (1981) (arguing that SEC regulations lack empirical rationale).
19. Harold M. Williams served as Chairman of the SEC from 1977 to 1981.
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tive officer who would not serve as chairman of the board), 0 that
audit and nominating committees be comprised solely of indepen-
dent directors,2" and that neither the general inside nor outside
counsel should serve as director to the corporation,22 he called
upon the corporate community to implement these measures." Al-
though these "exhortations" may have had an in terrorem im-
pact,2 4 they reveal that even the SEC was wary of regulating corpo-
rate governance in the absence of compelling justification. Indeed,
during hearings in the 96th Congress, Chairman Williams testified
against enactment of the Metzenbaum bill, which would have im-
posed such regulation on corporate boards2 5 Describing his "severe
20. See Williams, Corporate Accountability and Corporate Power, in H. WILLIAMS & I.
SHAPIRO, POWER AND AccOUNTABILITY: THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE CORPORATE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS (1979) (The 1979 Benjamin F. Fairless Memorial Lectures); H. Williams, Corpo-
rate Accountability, Address before the Fifth Annual Securities Regulation Institute, San
Diego, Cal., at 26 (Jan. 18, 1978) (available from the Securities and Exchange Commission).
21. See H. Williams, Speech Before the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, reported
in FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) No. 885, pt. I, at 6 (Nov. 12, 1980); see also M. EISENBERG, THE
STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 205 (1976); M. STEINBERG, CORPORATE
INTERNAL AFFAIRS: A CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW PERSPECTIVE (1983); Brudney, The
Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597 (1982);
Haft, Business Decisions by the New Board: Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80
MICH. L. REV. 1 (1981); Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality-Ten Years Later, 32 RUTGERS
L. REV. 293 (1979); Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board of Directors: Fond
Hope-Faint Promise?, 76 MICH. L. REV. 581 (1978); Werner, Corporation Law in Search of
its Future, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1611 (1981).
22. See Williams, Corporate Accountability and the Lawyer's Role, 34 Bus. LAW. 7, 13
(1978); H. Williams, Speech Before the Seventeenth Annual Corporate Counsel Institute
(Oct. 4, 1979), reprinted in [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,318.
For further discussion on this issue, see Ferrara & Steinberg, The Role of Inside Counsel in
the Corporate Accountability Process, 4 CoRP. L. REV. 3 (1981).
23. See Steinberg, supra note 12, at 182.
24. For example, at Chairman Williams' request, the New York Stock Exchange re-
quired that, to be listed, domestic firms had to maintain audit committees composed solely
of outside directors. Some commentators contend that the Commission compelled the
NYSE to adopt this measure. See Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theo-
retical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV.
1099, 1274 (1977) ("[T]he SEC virtually thrust the audit committee rule upon the New York
Stock Exchange."); Kripke, supra note 18, at 190 ("[To characterize the New York Stock
Exchange's action as that of a self-regulatory agency providing voluntary leadership ... is
unreal." (footnote omitted)).
25. Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980, S. 2567, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. §§ 5-7, 126 CONG.
REC. S3754, S3755 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1980); see also Corporate Democracy Act of 1980, H.R.
7010, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. § 101, reprinted in Protection of Shareholders' Rights Act of
1980: Hearings on S. 2567 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. 360, 362 (1980). Certain provi-
sions of the bills would have required that a majority of a corporation's board be composed
of independent directors, that the audit and the nominating committees be composed solely
of independent directors, that directors have a "duty of loyalty" and a "duty of care" to the
corporation and its shareholders, that cumulative voting be required, that shareholders be
[Vol. 37:295
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reservations about the wisdom of legislation designed to regulate
the corporate boardroom," Chairman Williams declared that en-
actment of the bill might "retard" the goals that its drafters in-
tended to achieve.26
The Draft Restatement, according to its critics, thus dictates
to the corporate community the "proper" structure and role of the
board. 7 If a number of these corporate monitoring mechanisms are
already in place, however, these criticisms may be "much ado
about nothing." But the Draft Restatement requires more of the
corporate community than is currently in practice. Although a
clear minority of large publicly held corporations currently have
nominating committees,28 the Draft Restatement mandates this
mechanism. 29 Even more unsettling is the Restatement's defining
of the board's monitoring function. The Draft Restatement limits
the board's participation in management to observation and objec-
entitled to vote on major corporate transactions, and that extensive disclosure be required
in regard to such matters as employment discrimination, compliance with environmental
controls, tax rates, cost of legal and accounting fees, and planned plant closings. See gener-
ally Metzenbaum, Legislative Approaches to Corporate Governance, 56 NOTME DAME LAW.
926, 926 (1981) ("There is widespread agreement within and without the business commu-
nity that reforms are necessary in the governance of the nation's major corporations.");
Millspaugh, The Corporate Democracy Act-A Renaissance or Death Knell for the Corpo-
rate World?, 4 CORP. L. REv. 291 (1981) (suggesting that any major rewriting of corporate
law should proceed with great caution).
26. Protection of Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980: Hearings on S. 2567 Before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1980) (statement of Harold M. Williams, Chairman, SEC). In his
testimony, Chairman Williams stated that "the views which I express today are my own and
not necessarily those of my fellow Commissioners-although I believe that at least a major-
ity would agree with my conclusion at this time." Id. at 39.
It should be emphasized, however, that the SEC strongly advocated legislation to deal
with improper payments and off-books slush funds. The ultimate result was Congress' en-
actment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a note, 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1982)). See Foreign Corrupt
Practices and Domestic and Foreign Investment Disclosure: Hearings on S. 305 Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1977)
(statement of Roderick Hills, Chairman, SEC); Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977:
Hearings on H.R. 3815 and H.R. 1602 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and
Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
196 (1977) (statement of Harold M. Williams, Chairman, SEC).
27. See authorities cited supra note 2.
28. SEC STAFF CORPORATE AccouNTABILrTy REPORT, supra note 13, at 525 (finding that
only 29% of publicly held corporations, principally the larger ones, had created such com-
mittees). But see Andrews, supra note 2, at 36 ("Nominating and compensation committees
are so nearly universal that requiring them does not appear onerous.").
29. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 3.06. The ALI Council apparently has deleted this
requirement, making the use of nominating committees a matter of "good corporate prac-
tice." R. Perkins, supra note 10, app. at 2.
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tive oversight of management conduct.30 The drafters' exclusive
adoption of the monitoring model ignores the presence of at least
four other types of corporate boards,3" thereby rendering the
Restatement's approach "simplistic, over-formal, and self-
defeating.
3 2
The Draft Restatement's intervention into the corporate gov-
ernance structure is also unnecessary at this juncture because es-
tablished authority, as well as most publicly held corporations, rec-
ognize the need for the implementation of appropriate
accountability mechanisms 3 and controls.3 4 Moreover, because
reasonable minds may differ as to whether certain mechanisms
30. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 3.02; see Andrews, supra note 2, at 39.
31. Andrews, supra note 2, at 39 ("At least five kinds of boards have been categorized
in a recent study: the legitimating (most perfunctory), the advisory (somewhat less distant
but casual), the judicial (closest to the monitoring model), the dominating (highly manage-
rial), and the participating board." (citing J. Lynch, Activating the Board of Directors
(1979) (unpublished doctoral thesis, Harvard Business School))); see also Dent, The Revolu-
tion in Corporate Governance, The Monitoring Board, and the Director's Duty of Care, 61
B.U.L. REv. 623 (1981) ("[E]xpositions of the monitoring model to date have been rudimen-
tary. Its proponents have not suggested what forces will prompt corporations to adopt the
model and thereby move it from theory to widely accepted reality." Id. at 624. At a later
point, Professor Dent opined, "Acceptance of monitoring by commentators and corporations
has led the Corporate Director's Guidebook and some other authorities to speak of a duty of
monitoring as if it were established fact rather than a remote ideal." Id. at 633 (footnote
omitted)).
32. Andrews, supra note 2, at 39. The ALI Council apparently has heeded this criticism
and "now propos[es] that the board of directors may undertake such management if it
desires." R. Perkins, supra note 10, app. at 1.
33. Such mechanisms include audit committees composed of disinterested directors and
the maintenance of law compliance monitoring systems. See supra notes 12-13 and accom-
panying text; infra notes 34, 62-67 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text; see also SEC STAFF CORPORATE Ac-
COUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 13:
The audit committee today has become so well established that any com-
pany which has chosen not to establish such a committee, composed solely of
directors independent of management, should weigh carefully the costs of such a
decision in terms of liability and loss of control against the reasons, if any, for
not establishing an audit committee.
Id. at 583; Small, The Evolving Role of the Director in Corporate Governance, 30 HASTINGS
L.J. 1353 (1979) ("Although directors may be unable to verify personally that adequate con-
trols are in place to protect the corporation against loss of assets or insure compliance with
applicable laes, directors do have certain minimal obligations in this area." Id. at 1374. In a
footnote, Mr. Small stated, "Whatever may have been the purport of prior case law, in the
light of developing trends it would be foolhardy of directors not to receive assurances that
appropriate loss prevention and legal compliance programs are in place." Id. at 1361 n.35);
Veasey & Manning, Codified Standard-Safe Harbor or Uncharted Reef? An Analysis of
the Model Act Standard of Care Compared with Delaware Law, 35 Bus. LAw. 919, 930




such as nominating committees should be implemented, 5 the Re-
statement process may not be the appropriate forum for resolving
these issues. In light of the corporate community's acknowledg-
ment of the need for and subsequent adoption of monitoring mea-
sures, disputed issues in this area should be addressed through
such channels as the Business Roundtable, bar associations, self-
regulatory organizations, and governmental "exhortations" until a
consensus has been reached. The institution of internal corporate
mechanisms as a legal norm should therefore be saved for situa-
tions in which their adoption would clearly be in the shareholders'
and public's best interests.
This article will next turn to the business judgment rule and
related principles under the Draft Restatement. The discussion
will entail such subjects as the duty of care, the propriety of re-
quiring demand on directors before derivative litigation may be
commenced, and the application of the business judgment rule in
the special litigation committee setting.
II. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AND RELATED PRINCIPLES
The Draft Restatement's provisions regarding the business
judgment rule and shareholder derivative suits have engendered
further controversy. Opponents of the Draft Restatement fear that
it weakens directors' defenses against claims of negligence and fa-
cilitates shareholder derivative suits.36 Examination of these provi-
sions, however, reveals the drafters' effort to implement a rational
and effective theory of director accountability and a needed mech-
anism for shareholder protection.
A. The Business Judgment Rule
Section 4.01(d) of the Draft Restatement provides corporate
directors and officers with the protection of the business judgment
rule.3 7 In order to come within the ambit of the rule, the subject
director or officer must have "(1) informed himself and made rea-
sonable inquiry with respect to the business judgment; (2) acted in
good faith and without a disabling conflict of interest; and (3) had
a rational basis for the business judgment." 8
35. See supra note 28 and accompanying text; see also Andrews, supra note 2, at 38-39;
Kripke, supra note 18.
36. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 38; ALl Begins Debate, supra note 2, at 1021.
37. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 4.01(d).
38. Id.
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Under the Draft Restatement, the safe harbor of the business
judgment rule is available to directors' and officers' "deliberative"
decisions only,39 i.e., decisions that "a director or officer has atten-
tively and directly focused on and as to which judgment has, in
fact, been exercised."' 0 A major criticism of the provision is its re-
striction of the application of the business judgment rule to deci-
sions in which judgment has in fact been exercised. According to
this view, the number of situations coming within the scope of the
Draft rule is severely limited. Consequently, corporate fiduciaries
will focus on normally insignificant details. Their workload will
drastically increase, exposing them to liability for failing to "focus"
on a detail that at the time appeared immaterial."'
This criticism is an overreaction, for the trend in the case
law42 and scholarly commentary 43 supports only a "deliberative"
decision as coming within the purview of the business judgment
rule. Moreover, the commentary to the Draft Restatement explains
that "deliberative" decisions encompass directors' and officers'
judgments "to abstain from action as well as to act." 44 To extend
the scope of the Draft's business judgment rule to include "non-
deliberative" conduct would broaden the rule to an unacceptable
degree: it would transform the rule into a sword ready to pierce
legitimate shareholder interests.' 5 Moreover, the concern that
corporate fiduciaries would be held liable for neglecting to "focus"
on what "reasonably" appeared to be an insignificant detail is sim-
ply not valid. Under the Draft Restatement, the subject director or
officer would have complied with the duty of due care and, hence,
39. Id. § 4.01 comment a, at 145.
40. Id. The ALI Council apparently has deleted the term "deliberative." Under the new
formulation, the business judgment rule would protect decisions as to which "judgment has
in fact been exercised." R. Perkins, supra note 10, at 9.
41. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 38; Block & Prussin, supra note 2, at 12.
42. See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 384 (2d Cir. 1980); Francis v.
United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 33-36, 432 A.2d 814, 823-24 (1981); Kaplan v. Centrex
Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971).
43. See, e.g., Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 111-
14 (1979); Veasey, Seeking a Safe Harbor from Judicial Scrutiny of Directors' Business
Decisions-An Analytical Framework for Litigation Strategy and Counselling Directors, 37
Bus. LAW. 1247, 1252 (1982).
44. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 4.01(d) comment a2, at 195.
45. See generally Steinberg, Application of the Business Judgment Rule and Related
Judicial Principles-Reflections from a Corporate Accountability Perspective, 56 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 903, 915 (1981) ("[A1lthough courts should apply the business judgment rule
and related judicial principles in appropriate situations to shield management's conduct,
they should be careful to ensure that their processes are not used as a sword by recalcitrant
management to pierce legitimate shareholder interests.").
[Vol. 37:295
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would be absolved from liability."
The requirement of section 4.01(d) that the corporate fiduci-
ary have "a rational basis for the business judgment" 47 has also
attracted controversy. Opponents of the Draft argue that the "ra-
tional basis" standard creates an uncertain culpability standard,
almost resembling that of negligence. 48 The commentary to the
provision effectively refutes this argument by defining decisions
lacking a rational basis as beyond "the level of ordinary negligence
by being egregiously unreasonable. ' '49 Such a formulation, of
course, is not amenable to precision. Like most legal terms, it will
acquire meaning through application to concrete facts and
circumstances.
Case law bolsters the Draft's "rational basis" component of
the business judgment rule. Courts have soundly held50 that, even
though a director or officer may be adequately informed and may
reasonably inquire, he may still make an irrational decision.51 The
law should not insulate such decisions because the interests of
shareholders and innocent third parties52 outweigh any societal
benefits of such an expansive business judgment rule. 53 The stan-
46. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 4.01(a); id. § 4.01(a) comments a-c, at 150-58. As
an additional point, it should be noted that "the business judgment rule presupposes that
the directors have no conflict of interest," Lewis v. S.L. & E., 629 F.2d 764, 769 (2d Cir.
1980), and act in good faith, Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 380-83 (2d Cir.
1980). See generally Phillips, Managerial Misuse of Property: The Synthesizing Thread in
Corporate Doctrine, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 184 (1979) (historical development of corporate law
doctrine).
47. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 4.01(d)(3).
48. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 35; ALI Begins Debate, supra note 2, at 1027.
49. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 4.01 comment a, at 147.
50. See, e.g., Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del.
1971); Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148, 157-58, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (Del. 1966).
51. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 4.01(d) comments d-e, at 209-12; id. § 4.01(d)
reporter's notes 1-6, at 212-14; Small, The Rights and Duties of Directors under the Busi-
ness Judgment Rule, in STANDARDS FOR REGULATING CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS 110, 125-
29 (D. Fischel ed. 1981); Arsht, supra note 443, at 107; Arsht & Hinsey, Codified Stan-
dard-Same Harbor But Charted Channel: A Response, 35 Bus. LAW. 947, 955 (1980); Vea-
sey, supra note 43, at 1251.
52. See Steinberg, supra note 45, at 905 ("Like any rule of general application, how-
ever, [the business judgment rule] can be construed so expansively that virtually any man-
agement action may be deemed reasonably made in good faith.").
53. At least three strong policy considerations support the business judgment rule: (1)
if management were liable for mere good faith errors in judgment, few capable persons
would be willing to incur the financial and emotional risks of serving in such positions, see
Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 10, at 1603-04, 1615; (2) courts are generally ill
equipped to scrutinize business judgments, see Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630,
393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979); (3) management has the expertise to
1983]
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dard adopted thus must reflect these interests without holding
corporate fiduciaries to a "hindsight twenty-twenty" level of culpa-
bility. Because the "rational basis" standard meets this objective,
it should be retained in the Draft Restatement.
B. The Duty of Care
The Draft Restatement's definition of "duty of care" seems
uncontroversial because of its similarity to the duty of care stan-
dard adopted in the Model Business Corporation Act and by a
number of states. 4 The provision insulates from liability a
corporate fiduciary who has adhered to the standard of reasonable
care in section 4.01(a) even when a "deliberative" decision has not
been made.55
Traditionally, however, courts have rarely imposed liability for
negligent conduct on corporate fiduciaries, notwithstanding the
negligence standard of culpability in many state statutory and
common law definitions.6 This is particularly true in the absence
of self-dealing or conflicts of interest on the part of such officers or
directors.5 7 The Draft Restatement seeks to overcome this judicial
reluctance by making it explicitly clear that negligent behavior by
corporate fiduciaries is actionable5" and by establishing in section
7.06(d) a ceiling on damages in the absence of culpability surpass-
ing that of negligence. 9 As the defense bar has noted, the conse-
quences of the Draft's approach would be an increase in the num-
ber of judgments obtained against directors and officers. And
because the ceiling on damages is inapplicable in instances of
carry out the responsibility of making such judgments, id. at 630-31, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419
N.Y.S.2d at 926-27.
54. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 35 (1979); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 4.01(a)
reporter's notes 1-13, at 164-73.
55. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 4.01(a). This statement presumes that the corporate
fiduciary acted in good faith and had no disabling conflict of interest. See supra note 46.
56. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 4.01(a) reporter's note 12, at 172-73 (upon exami-
nation of state statutory and case law, stating that "'ordinary negligence' [is] the general
rule").
57. See, e.g., Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnifica-
tion of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968) ("[A] search for
cases in which directors of industrial corporations have been held liable in derivative suits
for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealing is a search for a very small number of needles
in a very large haystack."); Dent, supra note 31, at 645-46 ("Given the long-recognized fail-
ure of directors to do much of anything in the governance of corporations, one might imag-
ine myriad decisions holding directors liable for breach of the duty of care. But the duty of
care has long been moribund." (footnote omitted)).
58. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 4.01(a) comment f, at 162.
59. Id. § 7.06(d)-(e).
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knowing misconduct or recklessness, 0 as a matter of litigation
technique and settlement strategy, plaintiffs would normally allege
such misconduct."1
Notwithstanding the potential costs of exposing corporate
fiduciaries to a larger number of litigious complainants, the Draft
Restatement's approach, on balance, is commendable. For a num-
ber of years, leading members of the corporate bar, 2 bar associa-
tions,63 and the corporate community64 have declared that
corporate fiduciaries must undertake their due diligence obliga-
tions, including the need to make inquiry 5 and to focus on the
propriety of law compliance and loss prevention programs,6 with
60. The Draft Restatement, by implication, also seems to remove the ceiling on dam-
ages when the defendant acted with gross negligence. Section 7.06(d)(i) establishes such a
ceiling in duty of care cases in which the defendant can show that "the conduct or nonfea-
sance resulting in such defendant's liability did not involve knowing misconduct, or reck-
lessness, or otherwise surpass the level of ordinary negligence." Id. § 7.06(d)(i). In the ac-
companying commentary, however, the Draft Restatement states that section 7.06(d) chiefly
excludes the following types of violations from its scope: "(a) violations of a duty of loyalty,
(b) essentially 'reckless' violations of a duty of due care, and (c) duty of care violations
where the defendant or certain defined affiliated persons 'improperly' benefit." Id. § 7.06
comment e, at 397. The ALI Council apparently has clarified this issue by inserting "a reck-
lessness test as the basis for exclusion from the benefit of the ceiling." R. Perkins, supra
note 10, app. at 5.
61. See Block & Prussin, supra note 2, at 12.
62. See, e.g., Arsht & Hinsey, supra note 51; Small, supra note 34; Veasey & Manning,
supra note 34.
63. See, e.g., Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 10, at 1600-20.
64. The Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of
the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAw. 2083, 2101 (1978) (emphasizing the
need for policies and procedures implementing corporate law compliance programs).
65. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 4.01(b) (encompassing within the duty of care
"the obligation of a director or officer to make reasonable inquiry when acting upon corpo-
rate transactions or otherwise performing his functions"). As pointed out by the Draft Re-
statement, the duty of a corporate fiduciary to make "reasonable inquiry" is well-estab-
lished. Id. § 4.01(b) comment a, at 175-76; id. § 4.01(b) reporter's note 1, at 183.
66. See Arsht & Hinsey, supra note 51; Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 10;
Small, supra note 34; The Business Roundtable, supra note 64. But see Graham v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963), in which the Delaware Su-
preme Court stated that "absent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to
install and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they
have no reason to suspect exists." Id. at 85, 188 A.2d at 130. In support of Allis-Chalmers,
one commentator has stated that the decision, "rather than being one of the weaker legs in
our law, is one of the stronger and one of the more practical applications of reality to the
management of corporations and the criticism can be seen as largely, or to a large degree,
ivory tower." Ward, Fiduciary Standards Applicable to Officers and Directors and the Bus-
iness Judgment Rule under Delaware Law, 3 DEL. J. CORP. L. 244, 247 (1978). Regardless of
whether Allis-Chalmers was correctly decided twenty years ago, most authorities assert that
management would be ill-advised to rely on that opinion today. See RESTATEMENT, supra
note 1, § 4.01(b) comments a-b, at 176-83; id. § 4.01(b) reporter's notes 3-6, at 183-86; Small,
supra, at 1360; Veasey & Manning, supra note 34, at 926-30; cf. SEC STAFF CORPORATE
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greater vigor. Corporate support and implementation of these
practices have prompted some authorities to conclude that courts
today will impose ordinary negligence liability on directors and
officers. e
In light of recent Supreme Court decisions eroding share-
holder protection under federal law,"" a construction of corporate
culpability based on negligence principles is consistent with the
view that state courts will reverse "the race for the bottom"' 9 by
providing meaningful redress.7 0 Moreover, if the business judgment
rule of the Draft Restatement is to have practical meaning,
corporate fiduciaries must be provided greater leeway for error
when a "deliberative" decision has been reached. To apply essen-
tially the same culpability standard regardless of whether a "delib-
erative" decision has been made is not only incongruous but pro-
vides little incentive for directors and officers to take the measures
required to invoke the protection of the business judgment rule.
And although corporate fiduciaries would be vulnerable to an in-
creased number of successful actions for monetary damages under
the standard of care formulation of section 4.01(a), the Draft Re-
statement ameliorates the potential exorbitant recovery for negli-
gence by establishing a ceiling on damages. 1
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 13, at 583 (advocating audit committee composed of
independent directors); The Business Roundtable, supra, at 2101 (advocating law compli-
ance program).
67. See, e.g., Small, supra note 51, at 121 ("[O0n close analysis, it appears likely that
courts will hold directors to a duty to exercise ordinary care and diligence in carrying out
their responsibilities."); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 4.01 comment f, at 162-64;
Veasey & Manning, supra note 34.
68. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (" 'Corporations are
creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the under-
standing that, except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of direc-
tors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corpora-
tion.'" (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (emphasis in Santa Fe))). But see
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983).
69. See, e.g., M. STEINBERG, supra note 21; Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Re-
flections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Ferrara & Steinberg, A Reappraisal of
Santa Fe: Rule 10b-5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263 (1980); Comment,
Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861
(1969).
70. See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976 n.6 (Del. 1977) (viewing Santa
Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), as a "current confirmation by the Supreme Court of
the responsibility of a State to govern the internal affairs of corporate life"). But see Wein-
berger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).




C. The Business Judgment Rule and Related Principles in the
Context of Shareholder Derivative Litigation
Critics assert that the Draft Restatement would encourage the
initiation of, and discourage the termination of, shareholder deriv-
ative suits." There is merit to this contention. Under the Draft
Restatement, shareholder standing requirements are more easily
met," verification of the complaint is dispensed with," demand on
shareholders is not required 7 5 and security for expenses is gener-
ally eliminated. 76 In addition to easing some of the procedural re-
quirements in derivative actions, the Draft Restatement places a
heavy burden upon the corporation to procure the dismissal of a
properly instituted derivative action against one or more corporate
fiduciaries. An exception to the Draft Restatement's facilitation
of derivative suits, however, is its imposition of a rigorous standard
for determining when demand on the board of directors is
required.8
1. DEMAND ON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Under section 7.02(b) of the Draft Restatement, as a prerequi-
site to the bringing of a derivative suit, a shareholder must make a
timely demand upon the board of directors. The shareholder must
demand that the board prosecute the suit or take other "suitable"
corrective measures, unless the demand would be "clearly futile"
due to the board's inability to reach a disinterested determina-
tion.79 There is a trade-off for this stringent demand standard: The
determination of whether demand is required is entirely separate
from that of the board's ability to terminate the action when a
corporate fiduciary is a party.80
By severing the issue of demand from that of terminating liti-
72. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 36; ALI Begins Debate, supra note 2, at 1027; Block
& Prussin, supra note 2, at 3.
73. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 7.02(a); id. § 7.02 comments b-d, at 261-69.
74. Id. § 7.02(c). Moreover, if the complaint fails to satisfy the particularity pleading
requirements of the section, a court may permit the plaintiff to conduct discovery. Id. § 7.02
comment f, at 274-75.
75. Id. § 7.02(b).
76. Id. § 7.02(d); id. § 7.02 comment g, at 277-78.
77. Id. § 7.03. For more discussion on this subject, see infra notes 95-118 and accompa-
nying text.
78. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 7.02(b).
79. Section 7.02(b) requires demand also on a special litigation committee, if one is
established.
80. Id. § 7.02 comment e, at 270-71.
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gation when a corporate fiduciary is a party, the Draft Restate-
ment departs from what appears to be the traditional and prevail-
ing view.81 Under that view, if demand is required, a court will
dismiss the litigation pursuant to the board's disinterested busi-
ness judgment that the suit's prosecution is not in the corpora-
tion's best interests.8 2 Although the Draft adopts this principle
when extra-corporate parties are subject to suit,8 it declines to ex-
tend the rule to an action brought against one or more corporate
fiduciaries.8 4 In adopting this approach, the Draft acknowledges
the board's inherent structural bias 5 by assuming that application
of the business judgment rule to a board's decision to foreclose a
derivative suit is inappropriate whenever a corporate fiduciary is a
"legitimate" defendant8s
Treatment of the issue of excusing shareholder demand should
focus on whether the court would permit the board to prosecute
the action if the board so desired, or whether a board faced with
meritorious allegations would be willing to implement internal cor-
rective measures.87 Although the Draft Restatement requires de-
mand on the board to promote the foregoing policy position, it de-
81. See, e.g., United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64
(1917); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Steinberg v. Hardy, 90
F. Supp. 167, 169 (D. Conn. 1950); Babcock v. Farwell, 245 Ill. 14, 46, 91 N.E. 683, 694
(1910); Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 378, 329 N.E.2d 180, 185-86, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497,
504-05 (1975); Passmore v. Allentown & Reading Traction Co., 267 Pa. 356, 359, 110 A. 240,
241 (1920); 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 522, at 145
(rev. perm. ed. 1975). But see Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49, 54 n.5
(5th Cir. 1980) ("[W]e do not mean necessarily to equate the showing of interest that would
excuse such 'demands' and that necessary to vitiate subsequent director action. The former
is more rigorous."); Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The decision as to
whether a demand is excusable, however, does not necessarily answer the question presented
here, of whether a resolution by directors to seek summary termination of the suit should be
honored."); Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1162-63 n.6 (1st Cir. 1977) (participation by
fiduciaries in alleged misconduct, although not sufficient to excuse the demand requirement,
may nevertheless prevent directors from barring a derivative action).
82. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 n.10 (Del. 1981); see cases cited
supra note 81.
83. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 7.03(a)(i).
84. Id. § 7.03(a)(ii). In an accompanying footnote, the Draft Restatement clarifies that
"mere employees, junior officers, and others below the level of the board or the senior execu-
tives" are not to be considered as corporate fiduciaries. Id. at 295 n.,.
85. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 7.03 comment a, at 303-04; see also Clark v.
Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49, 52-54 (5th Cir. 1980).
86. The term "legitimate" defendant excludes those corporate fiduciaries who are
named as defendants without a factual basis and for whom summary judgment motions
would be granted by an impartial tribunal. See Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1162 (1st Cir.
1977); Lewis v. Valley, 476 F. Supp. 62, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
87. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 7.02 comment e, at 271.
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clines to articulate precise guidelines. For example, the Draft fails
to specify if demand is required when the subject directors author-
ized or "acquiesced" in the allegedly questionable conduct without
financially benefiting from it."8 If the business judgment rule were
applied to the board's decision to terminate the litigation, there
would be good reason to excuse demand. Such defendant-directors
generally would be incapable of exercising impartial judgment
about approving the initiation of litigation naming them as defen-
dants.8 9 The Draft Restatement's severing of the issue of demand
from that of litigation termination in this context, however,
presents a more difficult issue.
An argument can be made that a board anticipating judicial
review of its decision will be motivated to take corrective measures,
even though it may ultimately seek to foreclose the suit.90 Under
this view, demand should be required. On the other hand, it may
be asserted that requiring demand would simply serve as a delay
mechanism and impel corporate management and counsel to de-
velop "paper trails" for the purpose of persuading a court that the
board's motion to foreclose the derivative suit was based on a con-
88. The Draft Restatement states the following principles: "(1) demand is unnecessary
where a majority of the board is alleged to have been closely involved in the alleged miscon-
duct, but (2) a bare conclusory allegation that directors negligently failed to exercise due
care with respect to active misconduct committed by others is not alone sufficient to excuse
demand." RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 7.02 comment e, at 269-70.
89. See M. STEINBERG, supra note 21:
In order to preserve the vitality of the shareholder derivative suit in this
context, the. . . courts should excuse the demand requirement whenever a ma-
jority of "acquiescent" as well as "interested" directors are named as defen-
dants. Moreover, demand should be excused if a majority of the board is dis-
abled, such as being under the domination of a controlling shareholder. In the
above settings, the board should be deemed as "stand[ing] in a dual relation
which prevents an unprejudiced exercise of judgment." The reason for this con-
clusion is fairly clear: If a majority of such directors (including directors who
approved the challenged transaction) are given authority to determine whether
the suit should proceed, they will necessarily make a judgment, perhaps implic-
itly, on the propriety of their own conduct. To expect such directors who have
authorized or benefited from a challenged transaction (that has perhaps bene-
fited fellow directors as well) to judge in good faith whether the suit naming
them as defendants is in the corporation's best interests is futile. By the very
nature of their participation in the alleged illegal conduct, such directors are
incapable of rendering impartial judgment. A contrary holding discounts the re-
alities of the corporate decision-making process and fundamental principles of
corporate accountability.
Id. at 152-53 (footnotes omitted) (quoting United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper
Co., 244 U.S. 261, 264 (1917) (Brandeis, J.)). But see Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245 (2d Cir.
1983); Aronson v. Lewis, No. 203, 1983 (Del. Mar. 1, 1984).
90. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 7.02 comment e, at 271.
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scientious, thorough, and reasonable evaluation." Although both of
these arguments are plausible, in the final analysis the Draft Re-
statement correctly excuses demand when demand would not prod
the board into correcting the wrong.'
Finally, it should be emphasized that the Draft Restatement
substantially departs from the apparent majority view'" by sever-
ing the issue of demand from that of litigation termination when
one or more corporate fiduciaries are defendants. Perhaps the vin-
dication of shareholder interests and the promotion of corporate
accountability justify the departure. Nonetheless, the resolution of
this issue, although procedural in nature, will have a major sub-
stantive impact on the ability of aggrieved shareholders to bring
derivative actions.'e
2. SPECIAL LITIGATION COMMITTEE TERMINATION
Section 7.03 of the Draft Restatement concerns, inter alia, the
role of a special litigation committee in terminating shareholder
derivative litigation. The section provides that in a derivative ac-
tion brought against one or more corporate fiduciaries, the board
may establish a committee composed of at least three independent
directors. The committee, with the assistance of a special counsel,
should conduct an investigation and issue a written' report docu-
menting its findings on whether the litigation is in the corpora-
tion's best interests.' 5 Providing that the board complies with
those or comparable procedures, the court, exercising its "indepen-
dent judgment," may dismiss the suit if the justification offered by
the committee "[a] is not outweighed by the probable recovery or
other relief that the court determines is likely to result from the
litigation, [b] does not frustrate any authoritatively established
public policy, and [c] is advanced in good faith.""e
91. Cf. Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65
CORNELL L. REV. 600 (1980) (discussing the use of special litigation committee by board of
directors).
92. See Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 786 (3d Cir. 1982) ("[Tlhe court, in determining
whether demand is necessary, should consider whether a demand on the directors would be
likely to prod them to correct a wrong.").
93. See supra notes 81-82.
94. See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
95. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 7.03(b). For a clarification of the term "corporate
fiduciary," see supra note 84. If the derivative suit is brought exclusively against persons
who are not corporate fiduciaries, then the business judgment rule applies to the board's (or
relevant committee's) determination not to pursue the action. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, §
7.03(a)(i).
96. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 7.03(c)(ii). The Draft Restatement contains a number
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The commentary accompanying the provision97 explains that
the section "essentially" adopts the Delaware Supreme Court's de-
cision in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado" instead of the New York
Court of Appeals' approach in Auerbach v. Bennett.e"
Both Maldonado and Auerbach involved shareholder deriva-
tive litigation. The difference between the opinions sheds light on
the Draft Restatement, for each court applied a different degree of
scrutiny to a litigation committee's decision to bar such an action.
The Auerbach court employed an expansive business judgment
doctrine, asserting that, with the plaintiff bearing the burden of
proof, a court need inquire only into the disinterestedness of the
committee members and the adequacy of their investigative proce-
dures. Beyond that inquiry, a court may not intrude into the sub-
stantive propriety of a decision deemed to be within the board's
discretion. 100
The Maldonado court's two-step test demonstrated a stricter
scrutiny. Shifting the burden of proof to the defendants, a court
analyzes the independence and good faith of the committee and
the adequacy and reasonableness of its procedures and conclu-
sions.101 After the first test is satisfied, the court may apply its own
independent business judgment in determining the propriety of
dismissal. According to Maldonado, the court should weigh "legiti-
of other pertinent provisions, for example, (1) section 7.03(b), which outlines board proce-
dures, including the establishment, composition, and role of special litigation committees, in
derivative suits against corporate fiduciaries; (2) section 7.03(c)(i), which requires, as a con-
dition for authorizing court dismissal of such actions, that the procedures specified in sec-
tion 7.03(b) were substantially complied with or that the use of other procedures was justi-
fied under the circumstances; (3) section 7.03(c)(iii), which prohibits court dismissal where
the substance of the suit alleges self-dealing between the corporation and controlling per-
son(s); and (4) section 7.03(d), which outlines procedures, with certain limitations, by which
derivative actions against corporate fiduciaries can be dismissed judicially pursuant to
shareholder approval of a resolution to terminate the suit.
97. Id. § 7.03 comment a, at 304.
98. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); see also Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982) (Con-
necticut law), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983); Miller v. Register and Tribune Syndicate,
336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983).
99. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979); see also Roberts v. Ala-
bama Power Co., 404 So. 2d 629 (Ala. 1981). For commentary on this general subject, see,
e.g., M. STEINBERG, supra note 21; M. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND
REMEDIES §§ 14.01-.05 (1984); Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An
Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261 (1981); Dent, The
Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative
Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 96 (1980); Steinberg, The Use of Special Litigation Committees to
Terminate Shareholder Deriative Suits, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1980); Note, supra note
91.
100. 47 N.Y.2d at 631-34, 393 N.E.2d at 1001-02, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 927-29.
101. 430 A.2d at 788.
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mate corporate claims as expressed in a derivative stockholder suit
and a corporation's best interests as expressed by an independent
investigating committee. 10 2 In addition, the court "should, when
appropriate, give special consideration to matters of law and public
policy."' 10 Maldonado's formula for the exercise of the court's own
business judgment contrasts markedly with Auerbach's prohibition
against judicial "trespass in the domain of business judgment.""10
Critics of the Draft Restatement argue that the business judg-
ment rule applied in Auerbach'05 should be the appropriate stan-
dard. 10 The adoption of such a standard, however, would be unfor-
tunate. As the Draft Restatement recognizes, the use of special
litigation committees to bar valid shareholder derivative actions
against corporate fiduciaries is extraordinary. The inherent pres-
sure on committee members to discount the corporation's interests
when such persons are sued warrants careful scrutiny by the
courts. Accordingly, a court should independently scrutinize the
type of conduct alleged to have occurred, the suit's potential bene-
fit to the corporation, and the reasonableness of the committee's
determination.1 0 7 It should be stressed, however, that the Draft Re-
statement extends the Maldonado rationale.
Perhaps the Draft's most significant extension of Maldonado
involves the application of Maldonado's stricter scrutiny to all
properly instituted shareholder derivative suits against one or
more corporate fiduciaries.108 In contrast, Maldonado requires the
application of its standards of scrutiny only to cases in which de-
102. Id. at 789.
103. Id.
104. 47 N.Y.2d at 634, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929. It is noteworthy, how-
ever, that there was a stronger aura of wrongdoing in the Maldonado case, in which initially
all of the corporate directors were accused of a breach of fiduciary duty. In Auerbach the
suit contended that four to fifteen directors knew of illegal bribes and kickbacks and should
reimburse the corporation. In the former case, demand on the directors was excused because
of their alleged self-interest; there was no allegation of self-interest in the latter case.
105. Id. at 631-34, 393 N.E.2d at 1001-02, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 927-29.
106. See, e.g., THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE ON
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PROPOSED "PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS" 39-51 (1983); Andrews, supra note 2, at
36.
107. See Steinberg, supra note 99, at 24-28; see also Cox, Searching for the Corpora-
tion's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982
DUKE L.J. 959, 983 ("The proponents of the committee repbrt should have the burden of
proving that among all possible courses of action, those embodied in the committee's recom-
mendation are most likely to serve the corporate interests." (footnote omitted)).
108. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 7.03(a)(ii).
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mand on the board is excused."0 9 Consequently, the Draft provides
that derivative actions against a single director or executive officer
will trigger the formulation of a special litigation committee with
its attendant procedural and substantive measures that must be
met before dismissal is granted. 10 By comparison, under Maldo-
nado, an action against a single director or officer normally can be
foreclosed pursuant to the business judgment of the disinterested
directors."' Also, under the Draft Restatement, when a corporate
fiduciary is a party to the derivative action, a special litigation
committee apparently must be formed." 2 This committee must be
composed solely of "independent" directors, which excludes per-
sons affiliated with the corporation's counsel or investment
banker.11  Moreover, the defendant corporate fiduciaries do not
have the authority under the Draft Restatement to nominate or
appoint new members to the board who will serve on the special
litigation committee.""
The Draft Restatement's more stringent standard is based on
the implicit proposition that to allow directors to bar derivative
suits against fellow corporate fiduciaries raises serious questions of
conflicts of interest and neglects the inherent problem of structural
bias." ' Such a standard, however, does not impose an unduly rig-
109. 430 A.2d at 784 n.10 ("[W]hen stockholders, after making demand and having
their suit rejected, attack the board's decision as improper, the board's decision falls under
the 'business judgment' rule and will be respected if the requirements of the rule are met.").
110. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 7.03(b)-(c).
111. 430 A.2d at 784 n.10. This statement presumes that a majority of the board is not
disabled (for example, under the domination or control of the defendant corporate fiduci-
ary). See Abbe v. Goss, 411 F. Supp. 923, 924-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Penn Cent. Sec. Litig. v.
Pennsylvania Co., 367 F. Supp. 1158, 1164-65 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
112. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 7.03(b)(i).
113. Id. §§ 1.24, 7.03(b)-(c), (e). The ALI Council apparently has deleted this disqualifi-
.cation. See R. Perkins, supra note 10, app. at 4.
114. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 7.03(e)(iii). The ALI Council apparently has deleted
this prohibition in favor of a provision that "a director so serving must demonstrate his
independence by 'clear and convincing' evidence." R. Perkins, supra note 10, app. at 4. But
see Miller v. Register and Tribune Syndicate, 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983).
In Maldonado, the members of the special litigation committee were appointed as di-
rectors for the precise purpose of serving in that capacity. The Delaware Supreme Court,
although not forbidding that practice, placed the burden on the defendants to show, among
other things, the committee's independence. 430 A.2d at 781, 788-89; see also Genzer v.
Cunningham, 493 F. Supp. 682, 693 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
115. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 7.03 comment b, at 313 ("[F]ew occasions seem
as likely to evoke an almost instinctive sense of loyalty among board members as a minority
shareholder's attack on a senior corporate colleague."). Structural bias may be defined as
"an inherent prejudice against a derivative action brought against one's colleagues where no
self-interest or actual bias exists." Veasey, supra note 43, at 1273; see also Note, supra note
91, at 601 n.14.
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orous burden on corporate fiduciaries. If a committee complies
with the procedures enumerated in section 7.03, a court, exercising
its independent judgment, may grant the motion to dismiss. 11e In
this regard, the Draft Restatement correctly declines to draw a dis-
tinction between derivative actions naming a majority and actions
naming a minority of corporate fiduciaries as defendants. The im-
partiality of members of the board (or of the special litigation com-
mittee) does not depend on the number of corporate fiduciaries
named as defendants. The inherent problems of structural bias
persist, irrespective of the number of corporate fiduciaries accused
of wrongdoing.
The appearance of impropriety in the special litigation com-
mittee context is important. To shareholders seeking redress on
the corporation's behalf, judicial deference to a special litigation
committee's recommendation to terminate litigation must seem
particularly unfair."' To counteract the appearance (or indeed, in
some cases, the presence) of impropriety, yet retain the special liti-
gation committee's authority to terminate such actions, the Draft
Restatement correctly requires a court's independent scrutiny of
the committee's composition and determination before authorizing
dismissal of the action."'
D. Tender Offers
The Draft Restatement at the present stage has not addressed
the subject of control transactions.'"9 As in the special litigation
committee setting, it is crucial for both shareholder protection and
corporate accountability that the business judgment rule in the
tender offer context is not too broadly applied. A number of courts
have interpreted the rule as permitting target managements to
utilize a variety of defensive tactics to thwart hostile tender offers.
These techniques include announcing unprecedented dividend in-
116. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 7.03(c).
117. See Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1263 (Del. Ch. 1980) ("Aggrieved stock-
holders of Delaware corporations ought to be able to expect that an impartial tribunal, and
not a committee appointed by the alleged wrongdoers, will decide whether a stockholder's
derivative suit alleging breach of fiduciary duty has any merit." (citing Galef v. Alexander,
615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980)), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779 (Del. 1981)); see also Steinberg, supra note 99, at 29 n.142; Note, supra note 91, at
629.
118. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 7.03(c); see also M. STEINBERG, supra note 21.
119. Part VI of the Draft Restatement will address "transactions in control." It is not
included in the present draft. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, table of contents at xv; id.
introductory note at xxiii.
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creases, issuing stock to a friendly third party, entering into defen-
sive mergers with "white knights," and acquiring other corpora-
tions to raise antitrust obstacles." 0 To shareholders deprived of
the opportunity to tender their shares at a substantial premium
due to the obstructionist maneuvers of incumbent management, a
broad interpretation of the business judgment rule smacks of un-
fairness. Under an expansive construction of the rule, "[riegardless
of the tactic employed, management can easily manufacture a 'le-
gitimate' corporate purpose for its action, even when it employed
the tactic solely to perpetuate its own status. ' 12  Management's
success is practically assured when it employs sophisticated legal
counsel and investment bankers to lay a foundation for and to
structure its defensive maneuvers.
122
120. See, e.g., Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3612 (Feb. 21, 1984) (No. 83-1023); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden
Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 550 (1983); Panter v. Marshall Field &
Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care
Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d
Cir. 1980); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982); Berman
v. Gerber Prod. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978). For commentary supporting this
position, see Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to Resist
Tender Offers, 3 CORP. L. REV. 107 (1980); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boar-
droom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979); Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover At-
tempt, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 882 (1978); Fleisher, Business Judgment Rule Protects
Takeover Targets, Legal Times (Wash.), Apr. 14, 1980, at 15, col. 1.
121. Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64
CORNELL L. REV., 901, 926 (1979). See also Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 299
(7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981), in which Judge Cudahy stated:
Unfortunately, the majority here has moved one giant step closer to shred-
ding whatever constraints still remain upon the ability of corporate directors to
place self-interest before shareholder interest in resisting a hostile tender offer
for control of the corporation. There is abundant evidence in this case to go to
the jury on the state claims for breach of fiduciary duty. I emphatically disagree
that the business judgment rule should clothe directors, battling blindly to fend
off a threat to their control, with an almost irrebuttable presumption of sound
business judgment, prevailing over everything but the elusive hobgoblins of
fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion.
Id. Judge Cudahy also asserted:
This case announces to stockholders (if they did not know it before) that they
are on their own and may expect little consideration and less enlightenment
from their board of directors when a tender offeror appears to challenge the di-
rectors for control. [Accordingly,] only the submission to jury verdict of cases
like this one can restore confidence in our system of corporate governance.
Id. at 312; see also Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981); M. STEIN-
BERG, supra note 21; Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161 (1981).
122. See Steinberg, supra note 45, at 906-07; see also authorities cited supra notes 120-
21; Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, supra note 120, at 103, 120-22, 131 (maintaining that the
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For the protection of shareholder interests the Restatement
should at least require that courts independently assess whether
management's objective was to benefit the subject corporation or
to maintain control. If the preservation of control was a substantial
motive underlying management's conduct, then the Restatement
should require that the subject directors and officers justify the
fairness of the maneuvers and transactions.123 The presence of cer-
tain, although not necessarily determinative, factors would illumi-
nate underlying motives in control transactions. One such criterion
should be whether the decision to oppose the tender offer and to
engage in defensive tactics was made by "independent" directors
having no "significant relationship" 2 " with the senior executive of-
ficers or by those directors and officers whose economic well-being
depended on the subject corporation's continued separate
existence. 2 "
advice of an investment banker on the financial issues and of legal counsel on the legal
issues is desirable).
123. See Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980) (Under New
Jersey law, "[oJnce a plaintiff demonstrates that a director had an interest in the transac-
tion at issue, the burden shifts to the director to prove that the transaction was fair and
reasonable to the corporation."). But see Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293-
95 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981) (to rebut presumption of the business judg-
ment rule, plaintiff must show that the defendant's sole or primary motive was to retain
control); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980) (same). It has been said
that the Panter and Johnson cases go too far: "Under such an expansive interpretation,
management given the benefit of hindsight and the advice of expert counsel can practically
always set forth some rational and proper purpose to explain its conduct." Steinberg, supra
note 45, at 906. For a discussion of judicial treatment of burden of proof when corporate
control is a motive for the stock repurchase, see Gruenbaum, Defensive Tactics and the
Business Judgment Rule, 4 CORP. L. REV. 263 (1981) (comparing the approaches taken by
the Second and the Third Circuit Courts of Appeals toward the issue of burden of proof);
Comment, Buying Out Insurgent Shareholders with Corporate Funds, 70 YALE L.J. 308
(1960).
124. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, §§ 1.24, 7.03(e).
125. See Gelfond & Sebastian, Reevaluating the Duties of Target Management in a
Hostile Tender Offer, 60 B.U.L. REV. 403, 472 (1980); Steinberg, Fiduciary Duties and Dis-
closure Obligations in Proxy and Tender Contests for Corporate Control, 30 EMORY L.J.
169, 242 (1981); Williams, Role of Directors in Takeover Offers, 13 REV. SEC. REG. 963, 966
(1980). See also Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 300-01 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981), in which
Judge Cudahy stated:
Directors of a New York Stock Exchange-listed company are, at the very
least, "interested" in their own positions of power, prestige and prominence (and
in their not inconsequential perquisites). They are "interested" in defending
against outside attack the management which they have, in fact, installed or'
maintained in power-"their" management (to which, in many cases, they owe
their directorships). And they are "interested" in maintaining the public reputa-
tion of their own leadership and stewardship against the claims of "raiders" who




The Reporters to the Draft Restatement should be com-
mended for compiling a comprehensive framework of principles for
corporate governance and structure. With respect to certain provi-
sions, it may be argued that the document is too innovative in ex-
acting compliance with certain standards that the law does
not-and perhaps should not-require. For the most part, how-
ever, the Draft Restatement codifies legal principles having a firm
foundation in a number of jurisdictions.
The Draft Restatement's most serious obstacle is sustaining its
vitality in an atmosphere of continuing criticism. It would not be
surprising if some *members of the defense bar and certain self-
regulatory organizations and corporations continue their vigorous
attempt to "water down" the applicable standards. On a number of
matters, these critics may be correct in asserting that certain prin-
ciples contained in the Draft inordinately intrude into internal cor-
porate affairs and unduly favor shareholder litigants at the expense
of corporate fiduciaries. If these criticisms are implemented to an
excessive degree, however, the Restatement will serve as an insur-
ance policy for corporate malfeasants. In the final analysis, al-
though some changes may be appropriate, the Draft Restatement
must retain its present character if shareholders and corporations
are to be adequately protected.
directors of a target corporation are in a very special position, where the slavish
application of the majority's version of the good faith presumption is particu-
larly disturbing.
Id. (footnote omitted). Moreover, it should be recognized that management will often be
able to influence outside directors. See MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 494-95 (7th Cir.
1980), afl'd on other grounds sub nor. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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